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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-CONFLICT OF INTERESTS-GOVERNMENT
EXPERT'S PRINCIPAL EMPLOYMENT INSUFFICIENT TO
VOID CONTRACT ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY
In 1953-54, the federal government was faced with increased demands for electrical power facilities, particularly from the Atomic
Energy Commission and local consumers of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. The Eisenhower Administration had earlier expressed a
preference for private or local, as opposed to federal, facilities., In
view of this demand and preference, the government entered negotiations with Dixon-Yates, the sponsor-predecessor of the plaintiff
corporation, 2 in an attempt to reach an agreement on proposals upon
which a contract could be based. Specifically as an expert on money
costs and generally as an expediter of the negotiations, the government utilized one Adolphe Wenzell, an employee of First Boston
Corporation, a large investment firm with experience in this field.3
The government was aware of Wenzell's principal employment, that
he was a director and one of the many vice-presidents of First Boston,
and that the final government contractor might well select First
Boston to finance the project. First Boston continued to pay Wenzell's
salary, the expediter receiving only per diem expenses from the
government. Wenzell owned no stock in and was never employed by
Dixon-Yates. However, he did receive a commission on any business
which he brought to First Boston. After some weeks of negotiation
and shortly after Wenzell terminated his relationship with the
government, proposals were submitted which eventually resulted
in a good faith contract between the government and Dixon-Yates.
First Boston was selected by the contractor to finance sixty per cent
of the project, the other forty going to another firm. First Boston
later declined to accept a fee for its services. The contract was cancelled almost immediately, but not before substantial costs were incurred by the plaintiff. Upon the institution of suit for these costs,
the government sought to avoid liability on the ground that the
1. This preference was announced in President Eisenhower's State of the
Union message of February 12, 1953.
2. Plaintiff herein is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Arkansas. Seventy-nine per cent of the issued and outstanding stock is owned

by Middle South Utilities, Inc., whose president is Edgar H. Dixon. The re-

maining stock is owned by the Southern Company whose chairman of the
board is Eugene A. Yates.
3. First Boston Corporation had handled the financing of the Ohio Valley
Electric Corporation, a project similar to that proposed, some years earlier.
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contract was unenforceable because of Wenzell's conflict of interests
which violated public policy as expressed by congressional statute.
The statute prohibits employees with any interest, direct or indirect,
in a business entity from acting for the government in its relations
with such business entity.4 Held, for plaintiff. 5 Where the federal
government knowingly utilizes as a contract-expediter a person who,
because of his principal employment, may ultimately realize some
pecuniary benefit by virtue of future transactions between his employer and the government contractor, the expediter has no conflict
of interests sufficient to render unenforceable an otherwise valid
contract on the basis of public policy. Mississippi Valley Generating
Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 505 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
That contracts made in contravention of public policy are not
enforceable is clear. Before such contracts are unenforceable, however, the policy violated must be definite and dominant; it must be
clearly manifest in the statutory law or legal precedent of the
jurisdiction.6 The public policy allegedly violated in the instant case
was the ancient generalization that a servant cannot serve two
masters. This policy is given expression by Title 18, section 434, of
the United States Code, one of four such "conflict of interests" statutes
controlling the activities of present government employees. 7 The
legislative history of these statutes is sparse, but it would appear that
their underlying purpose is to insure that government employees be
impartial in their activities and obtain no advantage from their
position. In effect, the statute makes it a crime for an employee to
put himself in a situation where his impartiality may be endangered. 8
The cases arising in this area are few and not in point.9 A contract
4. The statute referred to is 18 U.S.C. § 434 (1958):
"Whoever, being an officer, agent or member of, or directly or indirectly
interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corporation, jointstock company ....
or other business entity, is employed or acts as an
officer or agent of the United States for the transaction of business with
such business entity, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both."
5. Bryan and Laramore, J.J., concurred in the opinion written by Madden,
J., Reed, J. (sitting by designation), and Jones, C.J., dissented.
6. E.g., Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945).

7. See note 4 supra. The other statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283, 1914 (1958).
There are a number of post-employment statutes covering narrower areas.
For a discussion of the conflict of interests statutes and some problems raised
by them, see McElwain & Vorenberg, The Federal Conflict of Interests
Statutes, 65 HARv. L. REV. 955 (1952). See also Dembling & Forrest, Government Service and Private Compensation, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (1952).
8. See McElwain & Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 957. See also, SENATE COMM.
ON ARMED SERVICES, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPILATION OF CERTAIN MEMORANDA PREPARED BY OFFICE or SENATE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL ON CONFLICT OF

19, 20 (Comm. Print 1955).
9. Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (1945); United States v. Chemical
Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926); Atkinson v. New Britain Machine Co.,
154 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1946); Rankin v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 357 (1943);
Architects Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 368 (1943); Curved Electrotype Plate Co. v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 258 (1915).
INTERESTS STATUTES
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made in violation of a statute is void, and further, a contract founded
on an act prohibited by statute is void though the statute does not
pronounce the contract void nor expressly prohibit it.10 However, if a
contract is merely collaterally connected with an illegal act, the
general rule is that the contract is valid if it is only remotely connected with the illegal act and rests upon an independent and legal
consideration." The instant case is distinct from other cases involving this statute in that (1) the government knew of any possible
adverse interests of Wenzell and (2) the pecuniary benefit, before
it could accrue to Wenzell, had to pass through a third party, First
Boston. These factors tended to distract the court from the purely
legal issues involved.
The majority of the court concluded that Wenzell had no conflict
of interests sufficient to render the power contract unenforceable on
the ground of public policy as expressed by statute. The statute
depended upon for an expression of policy is penal in nature and
must be strictly construed. The court found that, as between the
plaintiff corporation and the government, Wenzell had no conflict
of interests whatsoever; he merely shared the interests of the government and the plaintiff that the negotiations should produce a contract.
The only legal issue raised and decided by the court was whether
Wenzell had an indirect interest in the plaintiff sufficient to bring his
activities within the prohibition of the statute. The court found that
any possible prospect of pecuniary benefit entertained in the mind of
Wenzell was too remote and contingent to be treated as an indirect
interest. The court spoke of the inequitable effect on plaintiff of a
contrary decision while pointing out the "cynical" nature of the
government's defense. Indeed, the ultimate effect of the decision was
that of equitable estoppel, hung on the convenient peg of the government's awareness of Wenzell's dual position.
There were two questions raised by the facts offered in the government's "conflict of interests" defense: (1) whether Wenzell's
conduct came within the prohibition of the statute, and (2) if so,
whether there was a sufficient causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the resultant contract. In view of the broad language
of the statute and the purposes attributed to it,12 it would seem clear
that Wenzell's activities fell within the scope of conduct forbidden
by the statute. Wenzell certainly had an indirect interest13 in the
10. Miller v. Ammon, 145 U.S. 421, 427 (1892).

See 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§§ 1752, 1763 (1938).

11. The leading case is Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 258 (1826).
See 6 WrLLSTON, CONTRACTS § 1752 (1938).
12. See notes 4, 8 supra.
13. First Boston's fee for financing the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
was $150,000 plus $20,000 in expenses. Since the fee in the instant case would
be similar in amount, it would seem that any bonus coincident with such fees

would be substantial enough to be an indirect interest.
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contract being negotiated with plaintiff and consequently was precluded from acting for the government in its business relations with
the plaintiff. The fact that any benefit which Wenzell might realize
would of necessity pass first through the investment bank is of no
consequence. It is not necessary that any benefit pass at all; nor
need the government show any bad faith on the part of Wenzell.
Furthermore, the government's awareness of the duality of Wenzell's
position is immaterial. The government is neither bound nor estopped
by acts of its officers or agents, i.e., those persons aware of Wenzell's
situation. Nor can the government be estopped to deny the formation
of a contract which would be invalid as against public policy or in
violation of a statute.14 However, assuming that the statute was
violated, the contract was not automatically rendered unenforceable.
A sufficient causal relationship between the illegal act and the final
contract must still be shown.' 5 The sufficiency of this relationship is
one of degree and from the multitude of facts in the case, a finding
either way would have support. It is felt that the court's holding
would have rested more firmly upon a negative answer as to the
question of the sufficiency of the causal relationship. Serious problems
arise in this area when the government seeks to utilize the services of
civilian experts either as volunteer or "without compensation" employees (WOC's). The need for such services becomes greatest during periods of national emergency. The conflict of interests statutes
may sometimes operate as a bar to the satisfaction of this need.
Statutory exemption has been used to avoid such an effect as is found
in section 710(b) of the Defense Production Act which gave the
President authority to exempt certain persons from the operation of
the conflict of interests statutes.16 Judicial exemption, however, has
not heretofore been authorized. The interest of the government in
obtaining the services of these men, important though it may be, is
properly relegated to the Congress. The courts should not abridge
the scope of a statute as the court in the instant case seems to have
done.

17

CRIMINAL LAW-ATTEMPT-CONVICTION OF ATTEMPT
TO RECEIVE PROPERTY NOT IN FACT STOLEN
Defendant was charged with an attempt to receive stolen property.

On apprehension of the thief, the goods in question were recovered
14. United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 98 (3d ed. 1957).
15. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1752 (1938).

See 1

16. 64 Stat. 798 § 710(b) (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 2160 (1958). See McElwain &
Vorenberg, supra note 7; Dembling &Forrest, supra note 7.
17- Principal case disapproved 45 VA. L. Ray. 1241 (1959). Petition for cert.
granted, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3293 (Apr. 5, 1960).
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and in cooperation with the police the thief allegedly sold and
delivered them to the defendant. The sole defense asserted was that
at the time of the "sale" the goods had lost their character as
"stolen" property and thus defendant could not be guilty of an attempt to receive stolen property. Defendant's motion to set aside
the information was denied and he then petitioned for writ of prohibition. In proceedings on this petition, held, writ of prohibition dis-

charged, petition denied. One may be convicted of an attempt to receive stolen property if he believes it to be stolen even though, in
fact, it has been "recovered" by the police. Faustinav. Superior Court,
345 P.2d 543 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
Where the accomplishment of an intended crime is rendered impossible by facts or circumstances unknown to the defendant two
approaches have been employed. These lines of thought are best
illustrated by the early New York cases of People v. Gardner' and
People v. Jaffe.2 In Gardner the defendant was charged with attempted extortion. In cooperation with the police, the intended
victim tendered the money demanded by the defendant who was
thereupon arrested. As to defendant's criminal liability for attempted
extortion the court stated: "His guilt was just as great as if he had
actually succeeded in his purpose."'3 Some eight years later the same
court in Jaffe, a case with facts indistinguishable from those of the
instant case,4 reversed a conviction of attempt to receive stolen property on the ground that "if all which an accused person intends to do
would, if done, constitute no crime, it cannot be a crime to attempt
to do with the same purpose a part of the thing intended.15 It has
been asserted that these cases may be reconciled on the theory that
in the former the crime was only factually, while in the latter, legally
impossible. 6 On the contrary, it has been suggested that they simply
involve conflicting theories: Gardner-type cases proceed on a theory
of subjective punishment, i.e., since defendant's intent and actions are
just as reprehensible as if the crime were possible, he should be
punished; and that those of the Jaffe-type proceed on an objective
theory, i.e., defendant did not and could not legally nor logically
commit the crime intended and therefore he should not be punished.7
1. 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894).
2. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
3. 38 N.E. at 1003.
4. Defendant purchased goods which initially had been stolen but had been
recovered by the police prior to the purchase by defendant.
5. 78 N.E. at 170.
6. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 167 Atl. 344 (1933); Perkins,
Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 319, 338 (1955);
25 MiNN. L. REV. 796 (1941). No criterion has been found for determining

whether on a given set of facts the impossibility of the crime will be declared
by the court to be legal or factual. This analysis therefore is questionable.
7. See 73 So. AFRICAN L. J. 361, 362 (1956); Keedy, Criminal Attempts- at
Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 464, 489 (1954); Sayre, Criminal Attempts,
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The court in the principal case rejected Jaffe and followed the
California case of People v. Camodeca.8 The Camodeca case on facts
quite similar to Gardner followed the latter case, and without mentioning Jaffe declared: "In the present case there was not a legal
but only a factual impossibility of consummating the intended offense ...."10 The reasoning of the instant court was, apparently, that
since the California Supreme Court had approved Gardner, it would
reject Jaffe, and since the lower appellate court was bound by this
decision, it too must reject Jaffe. Necessarily this court held either
that the instant case involved factual impossibility" or that California
follows the subjective theory in all cases, 12 without distinguishing
between legal and factual impossibility.
It is submitted that the court indulged in fallacious reasoning in
holding that the Camodeca case controlled. The latter case, as already
pointed out, specifically declared that under the facts before that
court the crime intended was "not a legal but only a factual impossibility," thereby implying that legal impossibility would be a defense. It appears that the court failed to examine the reasoning supporting either Camodeca and Gardner, or Jaffe.13 Clearly, if Jaffe
involved legal impossibility so does the instant case. The opinion is
not clear, however, and the court, perhaps recognizing the confusion
and doubt prevalent in this area and especially the difficulty of
distinguishing between legal and factual impossibility, may have decided that the result reached was more in accord with the public
41 HARv. L. REV. 821, 854, 859 (1928); comment, 73 S.A.L.J. 361, 362 (1956);
comment, 25 MNum. L. REV. 796 (1941).

8. 338 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1959).
9. Defendant in Camodeca was convicted of attempt to commit grand theft
by false pretenses. The intended victim had cooperated with police in allowing
defendant to think he had succeeded in his efforts to frighten the victim into
paying the money he demanded.
10. 338 P.2d at 906.
11. This holding would be flatly inconsistent with Jaffe.
12. This holding would be in conflict with the implication of the Supreme
Court of California statement in Camodeca that "in the present case there
was not a legal but only a factual impossibility."
13. The Jaffe court placed great emphasis on the fact that the applicable
New York statute required knowledge that the goods received were stolen.
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 496 (Deering 1959): "1. Every person who buys or receives any property which has been stolen . . . knowing the same to be so
stolen . . . is punishable." (Emphasis supplied.) The Jaffe court reasoned

that in addition to the impossibility of committing the offense arising out of
the fact that the property was no longer stolen, the crime was impossible on
the ground that defendant, if the goods were not stolen, could not know that
they were stolen. Cf. Masters, The Crime of Receiving Stolen Property Knowing It to Have Been Stolen, 64 S.A.L.J. 189, 192 (1947): "Knowledge is not
confined to that mental state of awareness produced by personal participation
in the theft or by information derived from the actual thieves, but includes
also a conviction or belief engendered by the attendant circumstances. On the
other hand, mere suspicion not amounting to conviction or belief is not knowledge." Is the line between "belief engendered by the attendant circumstances"
and "mere suspicion not amounting to conviction" not a fine one?
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interest of deterring crime.14 Quaere, does this reasoning not approach dangerously near to punishing mere criminal intent under
the guise of a charge of attempt?

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-UNIFORM RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT-RELIEF FROMEXTRADITION UPON PETITION OF THE OBLIGOR
Petitioner was indicted for the crime of failing to provide for the
support of his three minor children who were residing with their
mother in Kansas.' Extradition from Oregon was sought to be
avoided by filing a petition under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.2 The petitioner contended that by submitting
to the jurisdiction of and complying with an order of support entered
against him by the Oregon Court in favor of his children he could
be relieved of extradition. The lower court sustained defendant's
(the former wife) demurrer and dismissed the petition. On appeal to
the Supreme Court of Oregon, held, reversed. Under the Uniform
Act the Oregon court has jurisdiction to enter a support order, compliance with which will relieve the petitioner of extradition. Lefler
v. Lefler, 344 P.2d 754 (Ore. 1959).
The need has long been felt for a practical means of enforcing
duties to support owed to deserted families. Criminal enforcement
proved to be costly, ineffective, and encumbered with technical rules
of law. 3 The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was
designed 4 to facilitate interstate enforcement of duties of support
by use of a civil action 5 supplemented by criminal enforcement
provisions. 6 Under the act, an "obligee"7 may institute a civil action
14. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 464, 489

(1954); Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 859 (1928); comment,
25 MINN. L. REv. 796, 797 (1941); comment, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1941).

1. A criminal proceeding had been instituted in Kansas, a fugitive warrant
had been served upon petitioner, and extradition had been allowed by the
Governor of Oregon.
2. This act is codified in ORE. REV. STAT. § 110.005 (1959); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-419 (Supp. 1955).
3. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to 1950 Act, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 3
(1957). Brockelbank, Relief from Extradition under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, 19 Mo. L. REV. 191, 193 (1954).

4. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to 1950 Act, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 4
(1957). Phillips v. Phillips, 336 Mass. 561, 146 N.E.2d 919 (1958).
5. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 7-33 (1952).

6. Section 5 of the act provides:
"The Governor of this state (1) may demand from the Governor of any
other state the surrender of any person found in such other state who is
charged in this state with the crime of failing to provide for the support
of any person in this state and (2) may surrender on demand by the
Governor of any other state any person found in this state who is charged
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to determine whether a duty of support exists. If a duty is found,
the record of the initiating state is forwarded to the "obligor's"8
state (responding state) where another hearing is had. If the responding court also finds a "duty," an order of support is entered. 9
In the alternative, or if the civil proceeding is ineffective, one may
institute a criminal proceeding under section 5 of the act to extradite
the obligor. Most states 10 have adopted the act in a form which
includes the criminal enforcement provision and a provision which
purports to grant "relief" from extradition. The question presented is
whether an obligor may avoid extradition when a criminal proceeding
only has been instituted by submitting to the jurisdiction of the
court in his state and by petitioning for and complying with an order
of support entered against him. Few courts have been called upon
to decide this question; two views have evolved. The "California
view" is that an obligor may not independently institute a civil
action for the purpose of defeating the extradition process." Courts
in such other state with the crime of failing to provide for the support
of a person in such other state . ..

."

9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 23 (1957).

Section 6 provides:
"Any obligor contemplated by Section 5, who submits to the jurisdiction
of the court of such other state and complies with the court's order of
support, shall be relieved of extradition for desertion or nonsupport
entered in the courts of this state during the period of such compliance."
9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 25 (1957).

7. "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed. UNI-

FORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2 (1952).

8. "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. UNIFORM RECIP-

ROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2 (1952).
9. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 13-27 (1952).
10. Forty-nine states, plus the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico,
have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. New York
and the Virgin Islands have adopted the Uniform Support of Dependents Law
which has similar enforcement provisions. The acts adopted in Colorado,
Connecticut, Iowa and Massachusetts do not contain the criminal enforcement
sections.
11. This view had its birth in a case similar to the instant case. Petitioner
sought to be relieved of extradition; obligee had not instituted any civil
action. The court stated:
"[T]he act contemplates two distinct courses of action in enforcement of
support duties: (1) extradition and (2) the initiation of civil proceedings
in the demanding state, with an opportunity thereafter given to the
obligor to submit to the subsequently assumed jurisdiction of the court
in the responding state. While either or both courses of action may be
pursued, the election lies wholly with the demanding state and the
obligee; and the obligor may not independently institute an action in the
responding state for the purpose of defeating the extradition process."
Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal.2d 379, 273 P.2d 820, 823 (1954).
Since this case, California has adopted the amendment proposed by Commissioners on Uniform Laws set out in note 19 infra. North Carolina has added
the following language to section 6: "Provided, however, that an obligor may
not upon ex parte petition avail himself of the provisions of this chapter."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-7 (Supp. 1959). Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts and New York have, by omitting section 6 from their acts, provided
no way to obtain relief from extradition. See Ex Parte Susman, 116 Cal. App.
2d 698, 254 P.2d 161 (1953) (where California law made provision for relief
from criminal enforcement of the duty of support but New York law did not, a
father indicted in New York would not be relieved from extradition under
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following this view reasoned that the obligee is not before the court
in the responding state; therefore, the needs of the obligee cannot
be properly determined and a danger exists that only token support
payments would be awarded without such information.'2 Under the
"Florida view," it was held that extradition may be avoided by
submitting to the jurisdiction of the responding state's court and by
compliance with an order entered by it for support.13
The court in the instant case follows the Florida view holding that
the Oregon court has jurisdiction to entertain obligor's petition, enter
an order of support, and relieve obligor from extradition upon compliance therewith. By looking to the underlying considerations the
court determines that the act was not designed to punish but rather
to facilitate enforcement of support duties. In the words of the court,
"punishment for what has taken place in the past may be minor as
compared with the urgency of preventing further neglect."'1 4 The
court felt that the "token support payment" possibility presented no
real danger because the courts were not helpless to acquaint themselves with the obligee's needs through the existing rules of procedure
or by devising the needed procedure.' 5
This conflict of interpretation of section 6 of the act is undesirable;
uniform interpretation is imperative if maximum effectiveness of a
"uniform act" is to be achieved. The court in the instant case and the
proponents of the more liberal view contend that the whole purpose
of the act is to secure financial support for the obligee and not to
punish the obligor. 16 They urge that this purpose can more effectively
be attained by permitting the obligor to remain in the responding
state where he has employment rather than uprooting him from the
source of any means of support. Under a strict interpretation it can
be said that the obligor is a fugitive and that it is not desirable for
the California statute). See Brockelbank, note 3 supra, for a discussion of
sections 5 and 6. It is his conclusion that the act did not intend that civil
proceedings would be initiated by the obligor.
12. Sands v. Sands, 136 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Ex parte Floyd, 43
Cal.2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954).

13. Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957), discussed in 58 COLuM. L.

REv.

421 (1958). Arizona has made it possible to avoid extradition under the following statutory provision: "[T]he obligor may be relieved of extradition...
if he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court of this state and complies
with the courts' order of support. In order to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court of this state, such obligor shall file a verified petition"

containing personal information and a statement that he is willing to submit

to the jurisdiction of the court and comply with its orders. ARZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-1655 (1956). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 99-906a (1958) for a similar
enactment.
14. 344 P.2d at 763. Commonwealth ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super.
100, 103 A.2d 430 (1954).
15. 344 P.2d at 763. This approach is sanctioned by Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d

1 (Fla. 1957).

16. Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal.2d 379, 273 P.2d 820, 824 (1954) (dissent); Jackson
v. Hall, 97 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957); State v. Monroe, 30 N.J. 160, 152 A.2d 362,
368 (1959); 10 ALA. L. REV. 209, 215. (1958).
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him to defeat extradition once there is a request for his surrender.
However, a greater objection seems to be that if the obligor is able
to institute a civil proceeding to determine the extent of his duty, if
any, there is no provision in the present act under which the obligee
17
is given notice or an opportunity to be heard in the responding state.
Also, could it not be said that the responding court lacks a basis for
jurisdiction over the obligee to render such an order? 18 In an effort
to resolve this conflict, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
have recommended the adoption of a completely new section 6.19 This
amendment contemplates that only the obligee shall institute the civil
proceeding and that extradition will not be granted unless a civil
proceeding is instituted or unless it is shown that it would be of no
avail. This seems to more adequately insure that the obligee's needs
will be before the court in the responding state as a result of the
than the ex parte decivil action and should prove more desirable
20
termination sanctioned by this court.
17. The present provisions of the act relating to procedure to be followed
in pursuit of the civil remedy are not capable of being utilized in an action
instituted by the obligor. In the instant case and Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d
1 (Fla. 1957), it was acknowledged that the existing procedure would not be
applicable but this problem was passed over by suggesting that the courts
devise rules of procedure. This, of course, would not lead to uniformity of
application with each court devising its own rules.
18. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). In this case the United
States Supreme Court held that the Nevada court, having no personal jurisdiction over the wife, had no power to extinguish any right she had to
financial support from her husband. The Court also stated, "it has long been
the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or
obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." See
also, Weber v. Weber, 342 P.2d 472 (Cal. 1959).
19. The pertinent provisions of the amendment are as follows:
"(a) Before making demand on the Governor of any other state for the
surrender of a person charged in this state with the crime of failing to
provide for the support of any person, the Governor of this state may
require any [prosecuting attorney] of this state to satisfy him that at
least [sixty] days prior thereto the obligee brought an action for the
support under this act, or that the bringing of an action would be of no
avail.
"(b) When under this or a substantially similar act, a demand is made
upon the Governor of this state by the Governor of another state for the
,surrender of a person charged in the other state with the crime of failing
to provide support, the Governor may call upon any [prosecuting attorney] to investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to report
to him whether any action for support has been brought under this act
or would be effective. (c) If an action for the support would be effective
and no action has been brought, the Governor may delay honoring the
demand for a reasonable time to permit prosecution of an action for
support. (d) If an action for support has been brought and the person
demanded has prevailed in that action, the Governor may decline to honor
the demand. (e) If an action for support has been brought and pursuant
thereto the person demanded is subject to a support order, the Governor
may decline to honor the demand so long as the person demanded is complying with the support order." UNIFoRM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
SUPPORT ACT

§ 6 (1958).

20. Many interesting problems are raised under the view adopted in the
instant case. Assuming that the obligee is only the prosecuting witness in the
criminal action for extradition, can it be said that the obligee has submitted
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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS-GUILTY PLEA TO TRAFFIC LAW
VIOLATION INADMISSIBLE IN SUBSEQUENT CIVIL SUIT
In an action for personal injuries against the owner and driver of
an automobile, plaintiff sought to prove the defendant driver's
negligence by introducing evidence of his pleas of guilty to traffic
law violations' arising out of the same incident as "admissions against
interest. '2 The trial court held the evidence inadmissible on the
ground that it was "prejudicial and of little or no probative value." 3
On appeal, held, affirmed. Pleas of guilty to traffic law violations
are inadmissible as evidence of a defendant's negligence in a subsequent civil suit growing out of the same accident. Ando v. Woodberry, 9 App. Div. 2d 125, 192 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1959).
It has been universally held that records of guilty pleas to criminal
offenses are admissible in subsequent civil suits based upon the same
incidents and involving the same issues.4 However, in recent times
to the jurisdiction of the responding state for the purpose of a subsequent
civil action instituted there by the obligor? It seems that there is no consent
to jurisdiction of the responding state by the obligee; therefore, the responding

state would have no basis upon which to render an in personam judgment
adjudicating personal rights of the obligee. Note 18 supra. If the obligor had
been relieved of extradition by way of a civil action, as in the instant case,
and the obligee then instituted a civil action to obtain an order of support in
the state of her domicile, could the obligor successfully contend that the civil
action instituted by him rendered the matter res judicata? Since a state, or
other political subdivision furnishing support to an obligee, has the right to
invoke the provisions of the act, it appears that the obligee would not be a
party to the proceeding, would not have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
responding state by consent or otherwise, and would not be bound by its
orders.
1. Plaintiff, a motorcycle policeman, was struck by defendant's automobile
while it was turning left at an intersection. Plaintiff claimed that the driver
failed to signal before turning and moved slightly to the right which misled
him into proceeding along side the automobile. The traffic law violations to
which the driver pleaded guilty were failure to signal before turning and
making an improper turn. 9 App. Div. 2d 125, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
2. The court, while in accord with many other courts' characterization of
admissions against interest, is apparently failing to distinguish between
"admissions" and "declarations against interest." It is well settled that the
admissibility of an admission does not depend on whether it is or is not
against the declarant's interest. An admission may be highly self-serving
when made, but it is still admissible if it is relevant conduct of the party
against whom it is offered. 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIENCE- 232 (1954).
Since the plea here was made personally by the defendant, there seems to
be no question that it was an admission. See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 242
(1954); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1066, 1067 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Ado v. Woodberry, 15 Misc. 2d 774, 181 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (1958).
4. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 242 (1954); Note, Effect of a Criminal Conviction
in Subsequent Civil Suits, 50 YALE L.J. 499, 504 (1941); for cases see Annot.,
18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1307 (1951). It should be noted that there is a distinction
between convictions based upon pleas of guilty and those rendered after trial.
In the first type the pleas of guilty themselves are admissions which are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Morgan, Admissions as an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921). The latter are
objectionable as hearsay declarations of the former judge or jury for which
there is no exception and the traditional rule has been that they are inadmis-
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many lesser offenses such as traffic law violations have been created
which are not in fact true crimes. The practice has become common
to plead guilty to such offenses in order to avoid the inconveniences
of a trial, and the pleas are thus only hypothetical admissions of
guilt; if there is a trial, the proceedings are conducted in a very
informal manner. These factors have given rise to the feeling that
the probative value of such convictions is outweighed by policy
considerations such as the prejudicial effect they are likely to have
upon juries.5 This attitude has led a few states to enact statutes
prohibiting the use of records of all convictions of traffic law violations as evidence in subsequent civil suits.6 The courts have construed these statutes as necessarily rendering inadmissible records of
guilty pleas to such offenses. 7 One state has excluded only records
of those traffic law convictions based upon pleas of guilty or nozo
contendere.8 However, without the aid of such statutes, the courts
have uniformly held that there is no basis for excluding evidence
sible in subsequent civil suits. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1346(a) (3d ed. 1940).

New York early departed from the traditional rule by holding the prior
criminal conviction admissible as evidence merely tending to prove the issues
involved. Maybee v. Avery, 18 Johns (N.Y.) 351 (1820); Schindler v. Royal
Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932); In re Rechtschaffen's Estate, 278
N.Y. 336, 16 N.E.2d 357 (1938). This position has also been adopted by a
growing minority of other jurisdictions. Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951) (conviction of conspiracy under the Clayton
Act admissible in a subsequent civil suit for treble damages under the act);
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604 (1936),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 557 (1936)

(conviction of conspiracy to defraud insurer

by intentionally burning insured ship admissible in a subsequent civil suit by
the insured against the insurer for loss of the burned ship); Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d 640 (1940) (conviction of
willfully burning insured property admissible in a civil suit for loss of the
burned property); Tucker v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Eq. 72, 137 A. 404 (1927)
(conviction of adultery admissible in a subsequent action for divorce based
upon adultery). This minority view has been adopted by the American Law
Institute. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 521 (1942). One court went so
far as to hold a prior criminal conviction as conclusive evidence of the facts
upon which it was based. Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller,
149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927) (conviction of arson by the plaintiff in an
action against insurer of burned property). It should be noted, however,
that this decision has been limited to those cases where a plaintiff seeks to
recover despite his prior conviction. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Anderson, 200
Va. 385, 105 S.E.2d 869 (1958) (conviction of driving while intoxicated not
conclusive in a subsequent action by the injured party against the liability
insurer). For a complete survey of the admissibility of prior criminal convictions in civil suits see Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 1287 (1951) and the Supplement
thereto.
5. See Drafter's Comment, UFoimV RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 63(20) (1953).
6. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-140 (1953); IowA CODE ANN. § 321.489
(1946); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.94 (1945); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-170 (1953).
(These are examples only and not all inclusive).
7. Ripple v. Brack, 132 Colo. 125, 286 P.2d 625 (1955); Tucker v. Heaverlo,
249 Iowa 197, 86 N.W.2d 353 (1957); Warren v. Marsh, 215 Minn. 615, 11
N.W.2d 528 (1943); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315

P.2d 277 (1957).

8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 738.1 (1953).
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of these convictions. 9
In the instant case the court was not bound by any statute of this
type nor was there any decision controlling the issue involved here. 0
The court did rely, however, upon a statute and two prior cases for
the proposition that according to the general view convictions of traffic
law violations are of small probative value when used in subsequent
actions." The statute relied upon prohibits the use of such convictions to impair the credibility of witnesses. 12 In one of the cases,
which involved the revocation of a motor vehicle operator's license,
the New York Court of Appeals held that a record of the defendant's
prior conviction, after trial, of a "failure to give a pedestrian the right
of way" was insufficient, without other evidence, to support a finding
that the defendant was "driving recklessly" at that time.1 3 The
other opinion, which came from the same court that decided the instant case, held that records of a conviction of a traffic law violation,
after trial, are inadmissible in a subsequent civil suit.' 4 Having
established this basic proposition the court then concluded that "if
convictions after trial lacks trustworthiness as proof of the facts
found, it would seem a fortiori that a conviction based upon a plea of
15
guilty has even less trustworthiness in that respect.'
The holding of the principal case is not only contrary to the great
weight of authority,16 but the conclusion is not logically sound. In
holding that there are stronger reasons for excluding pleas of guilty
9. Levelle v. Powers, 248 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1957) (making a left turn in
front of oncoming traffic); Frost v. Hays, 146 A.2d 907 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C.
1958) (failing to give full time and attention to operation of automobile in
violation of city ordinance); Henderson v. Henderson, 94 Ga. App. 64, 93
S.E.2d 822 (1956) (failure to yield right of way); Clinger v. Duncan, 166
Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957) (leaving motor running while standing
unattended on street in violation of city ordinance); Same v. Davison, 253
App. Div. 123, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1937) (violation of city speeding ordinance);
Canales v. Bank of California, 316 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (failure
to stop at stop sign); Griffis, Evidence of Dispositionof Related Criminal Case
in Subsequent Damage Suit, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 480, 482 (1958) "It is pretty
well recognized in all jurisdictions that such [traffic law violations] a plea of
guilty should be received in evidence as an admission on the part of the person
charged."
10. The only previous decision from a court of the appellate level in New
York passing upon the narrow issue involved in the instant case had held
directly contra. Same v. Davison, 253 App. Div. 123, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1937).
In that case the Fourth Department held admissible a prior conviction based
upon a plea of guilty to a violation of a city speeding ordinance. The court
in the instant case recognized that case but refused to follow it because it had
cited only Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 248 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932)
which was not good authority because the Schindler case had involved a
criminal conviction. 9 App. Div. 2d 125, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
11. 9 App. Div. 2d 125, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
12. N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAFFIc LAw § 2 (29).

13. Hart v. Mealey, 287 N.Y. 39, 38 N.E.2d 121 (1941).
14. Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537
(1949).
15. 9 App. Div. 2d 125, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
16. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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to traffic law violations than convictions after trial of such offenses,
the court failed to recognize the modern theory upon which admissions are receivable. That the plea of guilty here was a personal
admission by the defendant is too clear for dispute. 17 Personal admissions, as distinguished from vicarious admissions, 18 are any conduct of a party introduced against him which is relevant to the issue
for which it is offered. 19 Under modern theory the reception of admissions is justified not because there is a guarantee of trustworthiness of the matter asserted but because the declarant is not in a
position to complain that he was not under oath and subject to crossexamination at the time he made the declaration. 20 Of course the
declarations may have been made under circumstances that tend to
diminish their probative value and the party-declarant should always
be given an opportunity to explain those circumstances to the trier.21
Well known examples of such circumstances are those where the
declarant at the time of the declaration was intoxicated, 22 mentally
deficient,2 only partially conscious, 24 hysterical,25 speaking without
personal knowledge, 26 or had a strong motive to falsify.27 These circumstances only affect the weight of the evidence, however, and not
its admissibility.28 It is the duty of the trier, after all the facts are
presented, to consider the declarations in the light of all these circumstances and assign to it whatever weight it deserves.29 Thus while
attempting to give expression to the prevailing view that convictions
probative value, the court has
of traffic law violations are of small
30
treaded on tenuous logical grounds.
17. Authorities cited note 2 supra.
18. For an authoritative discussion of the latter, see Morgan, The Rationale

of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REV. 461 (1929).
19. 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVmENCE 230 (1954); accord, McComvncK,
EVIDENCE § 239 (1954).
20. Morgan, Admissions, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 18, 19 (1954).
21. McCoRMcK, EVIDENCE § 239 (1954); 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVI-

231 (1954); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1059 (3d ed. 1940).
22. People v. McCagnan, 129 Cal. App. 2d 100, 112, 276 P.2d 679, 687 (1954).
23. McAffee v. United States, 72 App. D.C. 60, 111 F.2d 199, 204 (1940);
Sinclair v. The King, 73 Commw. L.R. 316 (Austrl. 1946), 20 AUSTL. L.J. 395
(1947).
24. Middle Tenn. R.R. v. McMillan, 134 Tenn. 490, 505, 184 S.W. 20, 25
(1916).
25. Freidman v. United Rys., 293 Mo. 235, 238 S.W. 1074 (1922).
26. Janus v. Akstin, 91 N.H. 373, 20 A.2d 552 (1941); McNeely v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Corp., 284 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
27. Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932); Krajewski v.
Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 241 Mich. 396, 217 N.W. 62 (1928).
DENCE

28. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 240, n.6 (1954); 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 231 (1954); 4 WiMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1053 (3d ed. 1940).
29. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 26 (3d ed. 1940).

30. Quaere: Has judicial experience in New York shown that pleas of guilty
to traffic law violations are mere hypothetical admissions?
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE-DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION-ABSTENTION BY FEDERAL COURT FROM
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN DIVERSITY CASE
Petitioner, a county of the State of Pennsylvania, acquired property
of the respondents under the state eminent domain law,1 allegedly
because it was necessary for the enlargement of its Greater Pittsburgh Airport. Pursuant to the statute, a Board of Viewers awarded
damages to the respondents, which award was appealed by both
parties. While this appeal was pending, respondents, citizens of
Wisconsin, brought suit in a United States District Court alleging that
the condemnation proceeding was invalid because their property
was taken for a private use. Diversity jurisdiction was properly
invoked, but the district court dismissed the suit saying that it
"should not interefere with . .. a political subdivision acting under
color of State law in a condemnation proceeding."'2 The Court of
Appeals reversed on the ground that such an independent suit could
have been brought in a state court. 3 On certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United Sthtes, held, (5-4) affirmed. A district court may
not abstain from exercising its diversity jurisdiction in a state eminent
domain case which does not involve a possible premature decision of
a federal constitutional question, the hazard of unsettling some
delicate balance in the area of federal-state relationships, or some
unsettled issue of state law. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
By applying a doctrine known as "equitable abstention,"4 Federal
courts under certain circumstances will refrain from exercising
jurisdiction even though it has been properly invoked. The doctrine
of abstention, originating from the discretion of the chancellor in
equity 5 and our federal-state interrelationship 6 has been evolving

1. The provisions involved are found in

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

and §§ 5601-33 (1956).

16, §§ 5401-08

2. Frank Mashuda Co. v. County of Allegheny, 154 F. Supp. 628, 629 (W.D.
Pa. 1957).
3. Frank Mashuda Co. v. County of Allegheny, 256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958).

4. It should be made clear at the outset that this doctrine does not involve
a question of jurisdiction, but rather one of comity. See Harrison v. National
Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
5. See the statements by the Supreme Court in Gilchrist v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 211

(1929)

and Pennsylvania v. Williams,

294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935). Although the term "discretion" is still used by the
Supreme Court, in many of the situations under the doctrine, especially those
involving the possibility of unnecessary constitutional decisions, the district
court has no real discretion. See Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered,37 TExAs L. REv. 816-22 (1959).
6. "These prior cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply a
technical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy derived from
our federalism. We have drawn upon the judicial discretion of the chancellor
to decline jurisdiction over a part or all of a case brought before him."
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
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rapidly in recent years.7 In cases involving a federal constitutional
question which may be deferred or mooted by the decision of a state
court, it is fairly well established that the doctrine applies. 8 The doctrine becomes more nebulous, however, in cases which are before the
federal courts solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Abstention
in these cases is based on federal-state comity and the avoidance of
needless friction with the states. Past this general principle, it seems
impossible to delineate any categories other than those based on the
facts of the individual cases, often called by the courts "exceptional
circumstances." 9 Frequently the combination of an equitable action
and unsettled state law or some other peculiar circumstance' 0 results in the application of abstention in diversity cases. The influence
of the former is clear since the chancellor in equity traditionally has
discretion to refuse jurisdiction, and this concept has been thought
to limit abstention under diversity jurisdiction to equity cases.'
The influence of the latter was established in the leading case of
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,12 a bankruptcy suit, in which
the Supreme Court held that a question of the interpretation of certain documents under Illinois law should have been left to the
Illinois courts. Three years later this case was severely limited by
Meredith v. Winter Haven,13 which held that uncertain state law
alone was not enough to justify abstention. The net result from
these two cases seems to be that if exceptional circumstances-e.g.,
equity suits-combine with an uncertain question of state law, the
court has discretion to follow the course most likely to result in a
correct application of the state law.
A comparison of the instant case with another case decided by the
7. For a good short history of the doctrine see Federal Judicial Power: The
Doctrine of Equitable Abstention, 2 RACE REL. L. RE_. 1222, 1225 (1957).
8. For a discussion of the principles involved in this type of case and why

it is an obvious area for federal abstention see Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2101-15 (1959). As
to the procedures usually followed after the doctrine is applied see Learned

Hand's statement in East Coast Lumber Terminal v. Town of Babylon, 174
F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1949).
9. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943) lists the abstention
cases under this broad principle, along with the circumstances of the princi-

ple's application in each case. A good discussion of the categories of these
cases may be found in Comment, The Decline of Federal Concurrent Equity
Jurisdiction,40 CALIF. L. REV. 300, 305-09 (1952).
10. The other circumstances referred to in note 9 supra are: (1) interference
with a recognized, defined public policy; (2) interference with state criminal
prosecutions; (3) interference with state tax collections and fiscal policy;
(4) interference with, appraisal of, or shaping of, state policies regarding
administrative agencies; (5) interference with state administration of state
financial institutions.
11. This limitation could easily be inferred from the abstention cases which
for the most part have involved equitable actions. Meredith v. Winter Haven
characterizes the abstention doctrine as available on "appeal to the equity
jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts

12. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
13. Supra note 9.

....

"

320 U.S. at 235.
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Court on the same day,14 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 5 points out the importance of both the two situations
mentioned above. Both cases involved an eminent domain proceeding,
usually classified as an action at law. In disallowing abstention, the
instant case stated that there was nothing peculiar about eminent
domain and that in itself it does not justify abstention.' 6 In allowing
abstention, the Thibodaux case speaks of the "special nature of
eminent domain,' 7 implying that the action is sui generis and, for
the purposes of the action before the court, a suit in equity.'8 The
wording of the two opinions cannot be reconciled, but it is significant
that the majority of the court in Thibodaux felt compelled to classify
eminent domain as at least a "special" action. What may have influenced the court in Thibodaux to reach this apparently opposite
conclusion was the appearance of unsettled state law as a factor in
the case, 19 for in the instant case the state law was clear, or at least
held to be such. 20 Thus the importance of this factor was emphasized,
for there seems to be no other real basis for distinguishing the two
21
cases.
It is difficult to determine from these two cases just what status the
doctrine now has in the area of diversity jurisdiction. Apparently
14. Both cases were decided on June 8, 1959.
15. Supra note 6. The instant case was a five-four decision; the Thibodaux
case was a six-three decision. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion
in the instant case and the dissent in Thibodaux. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, one
of the dissenters in the instant case, wrote the majority opinion in Thibodaux.
A comparison is further justified, then, by the similarity of positions in the
majority opinion in one case and the dissent in the other.
16. 360 U.S. at 189.
17. 360 U.S. at 29.
18. "Although an eminent domain proceeding is deemed for certain purposes
of legal classification a 'suit at common law,' Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
(1 Otto) 367 (1875) . . . it is of a special and peculiar nature." Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, supra note 6 at 28. It is to be noted
that an equitable action is frequently involved when the plaintiff is one
seeking relief from an eminent domain proceeding against his land.
19. The confusion in this case resulted from a conflict between an old but
uninterpreted statute (LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 19:101-07 (1952)) granting
eminent domain power to cities and an opinion of the attorney general in a
similar case to the effect that a city has no such power in Louisiana.
20. The Supreme Court, according to its custom, accepted the state law
as found by the court of appeals. 360 U.S. at 191. Petitioner argued that
the law as found by the court of appeals was incorrect. Brief for Petitioner,
p. 41. In fact, the cases did leave some doubt as to the exact status of the
landowner's ability to attack the proceeding collaterally. That the question
was considered important is indicated by the extensive discussion on the
point in Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-25.
21. In the instant case the district court dismissed the case; in Thibodaux
the district court ordered a stay pending state interpretation of the statute.
This cannot distinguish the two cases, and in fact has not been used in the
past for this purpose. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in
Thibodaux, seems to be distinguishing the cases in this manner; but careful
reading reveals that unsettled state law is his real basis. For a discussion of
dismissal and remission, and their relative merits in abstention cases, see

Note, Louisiana Power & Light v. Thibodaux: The Abstention Doctrine Expanded, 69 YALE L.J. 641, 653 (1960).
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neither the nature of the actions nor unsettled state law alone would
have sufficed to justify abstention. The effect of the instant case is
to broaden the scope of the Thibodaux decision since it tends to cancel
out the language limiting that decision to eminent domain. Thus
unsettled state law assumes added importance; and the ultimate effect
of the cases may be to eliminate completely any limitation of the
doctrine to equitable actions, extending it even to tort cases, as the
minority in Thibodaux feared. If this should occur, the Meredith
case would be effectively overruled, and the doctrine would become
a strong bar to diversity jurisdiction. In Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in the Thibodaux case, the explanation was offered that the
majority opinion reflected a "distaste for the diversity jurisdiction." 22
If this is so, these two cases, with their majority and minority
opinions, indicate that the controversy over diversity jurisdiction
exemplified by Burford v. Sun Oil Co.2 3 is still raging. Fundamentally
this is a dispute concerning the respective areas of Supreme Court
and congressional action. Diversity jurisdiction exists by virtue of
legislation, and to what extent it can be avoided by the Supreme
Court on policy grounds is not clear.24 Whatever the result, these
two cases indicate that either Congress or the Supreme Court should
formulate some ground rules for diversity jurisdiction in those areas
where the abstention doctrine is applied.

LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACTSTATE COURT PRE-EMPTED FROM ENFORCING GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
An employee, a member of plaintiff-labor union, filed a grievance
petition with the defendant, his employer, alleging that defendant
had breached a provision of its collective bargaining agreement forbidding discrimination against an employee because of his union
activities. Upon defendant-employer's refusal to process the grievance, plaintiff-labor union sued in a state court to compel defendant
to submit the employee's complaint to the grievance procedures out22. 360 U.S. at 41.
23. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Writing the majority opinion in Burford, Mr.
Justice Black justified abstention on the ground that a Texas statute provided a uniform method for formation of the state's policy regarding the oil
industry. He held that federal courts should not interfere in such a policy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the dissent attacked the majority for trying to
abolish diversity jurisdiction and argued that the federal courts have a duty
to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress. See also Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
24. See the dissenting opinion in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 23, at
337-38.
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lined in their collective bargaining agreement.' Defendant-employer
contended that the alleged conduct from which the employee's
complaint arose 2 constitutes an unfair labor practice and that section
10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act 3 denies a state court the
power to compel the submission of such a dispute to the grievance
procedures. Plaintiff-union insisted that the state court possesses
jurisdiction to construe and enforce the grievance provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement even though the activities complained
of might constitute an unfair labor practice. On demurrer to the
union's declaration, held, for defendant. A state court is without
power to specifically enforce the grievance provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement where to do so will require the grievance board
to give redress for conduct which is, or may be, an unfair labor
practice. Local 774, International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v.
CessnaAircraft Co., 185 Kan. 183, 341 P.2d 989 (1959).
Section 10 (a) of the NLRA pre-empts state labor laws dealing with
activities either protected by section 74 or prohibited by section 8. 5
Under section 10 (a), the National Labor Relations Board has primary
jurisdiction 6 to determine whether specific conduct is comprehended
1. The grievance provision at issue in this case read:

"If the Personnel

Director, or whomever he may designate, and the Shop Chairman are unable

to reach an agreement, the employee shall be notified and his written notice
shall be referred to the Grievance Board." Since the union wanted this
dispute submitted to grievance proceedings, the narrow question put to the
district court was whether or not convening of the Grievance Board under
this provision of the contract required joint action of the personnel director
and the shop chairman. If the court decided the Grievance Board was to be
convened whenever the parties could not agree that a complaint did or did
not constitute a grievance, then the union prayed for specific performance of
the contract to arbitrate.
2. Before this action was brought the company had transferred the employee to another department because he developed dermatitis while working
with plastics and fiber glass. The employee was granted a leave of absence
to work for plaintiff in an organizational drive. When he returned to work
the employer told him that if he would not work in his original department
with the irritant materials he would be fired. The employee executed termination papers and delivered a grievance to the company which said, inter alia,
that he had reason to believe the company had discriminated against him
because of his union activities. The company reviewed the complaint and
decided it did not state a grievance. The union disagreed, and sought a court
decree commanding the company to agree to the convening of a grievance
board to hear the complaint.
3. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1959). This section provides
that the Board's power "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice .... [is exclusive and] shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise ... ." See note 19 infra.
4. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1959). See Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951);
International Union UAW, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Hill v.
Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
5. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §- 158 (1959). See Capital Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954); Garner v. Teamsters Union Local 776, 346 U.S.
485 (1953), 7 VAND. L. REv. 422 (1954).
6. Primary jurisdiction is the power to make initial decisions in a given
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by these provisions of the NLRA; if conduct is even "arguably subject" to the above provisions of the act,7 the Board's jurisdiction is exclusive. Breach of a collective bargaining contract is neither protected nor prohibited by the act, and enforcement of such agreements
is left first to the parties' contractual arrangements and ultimately to
the state and federal courts.8 It is well settled that state courts
possess the power to specifically enforce collective bargaining confield, exclusive of all other judicial bodies, including federal courts as well
as state tribunals. Pre-emption principles are applicable only after the
initial determination is that the dispute is within the agency's primary jurisdiction.
7. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959), 13
VA~m. L. REV. 416. Nonetheless, local authorities can deal with activity proscribed by the LMRA which also is within the traditional police power to
maintain law and order. E.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957);
compare United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954) with San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra. States may
exercise jurisdiction over matters "merely of peripheral concern to federal
labor policy," International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958), 12 VAND. L. REV. 287; or where there is "compelling precedent applied
to essentially undisputed facts," San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,

supra at 246. It is the nature of the conduct sought to be regulated, not the
relief sought, which gives the states jurisdiction. Id. at 241, 247-48. Notice
that these cases are among those delineating the appropriate spheres for the
"imposed" laws of state and federal governments. But see note 21 infra.
8. In 1947 the Federal Labor Relations Act proposed by the Senate included
a section 8(a) (6) which would have made it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or the
terms of an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration. Similar conduct on the part of a union was made an unfair labor practice in proposed
section 8(b) (5). Section 301 of the proposed bill related to suits by and
against labor organizations for breach of collective bargaining agreements
and was to be "read in connection with section 8 ... also dealing with breach
of contracts." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 30 (1947). The House
Report was likewise concerned with the problem of making collective bargaining contracts effective. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46
(1947).
These results from committee deliberations add a meaningful gloss to the
Conference Report: "The Senate amendment contained a provision which
does not appear in section 8 of existing law. This provision would have made
it an unfair labor practice to violate the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement or an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration. The
conference agreement omits this provision of the Senate amendment. Once
parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that
contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board." H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42
(1947) (emphasis added).
Although the legislative history is not clear it seems that state law was to
govern suits based on collective bargaining contracts whether the action was
brought in a state court or in a federal court under section 301. This prompted
those writing the minority report to conclude that the jurisdictional grant of
section 301 was of doubtful constitutionality because "the bill would apparently give the Federal courts jurisdiction of disputes over union agreements
affecting commerce regardless of diversity of citizenship of the parties. ...
[when] the substantive legal questions as to a contract dispute would be
decided in accordance with applicable State law." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1947). See also S. REP. No. 105 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12-15 (1947). Cf. Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). But see note 12 infra.
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tracts. 9 Prior to the Lincoln Mills case 0 it was widely assumed that
state law should be applied in such disputes." In Lincoln Mills
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act,' 2 and indicated that rights arising
9. See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 652, 662 (1945).
10. Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), 11
VAND. L. REV. 243.
11. See note 8 supra. But see Westinghouse case, supra note 8, at 452 n. 26;
Note, 7 VAND. L. REV. 374, 390-91 (1954). Although the legislative history discusses the problems of suing unincorporated labor associations, S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947), only cursory attention was given to
the status of contracts to arbitrate in the various states. Labor arbitration
can be carried out only under the common law in nine states: Alaska, Arizona,
Louisiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin.
Agreements to arbitrate future disputes arising out of collective bargaining
agreements can be specifically enforced in fourteen states by statute: Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 1280; CONN. GEm. STAT. § 52-408 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 57.11 (Supp. 1958); HAwAI REV. LAWS § 188-1 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 251, § 14 (1956) (applicable only to disputes cognizable at law or equity);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (Supp. 1958); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:1 (1955)
(inapplicable to collective bargaining agreements unless made applicable by
contract terms); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:24-1 (1952); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §
1448; OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Baldwin 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 161 (1930); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9-1 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04.010
(Supp. 1956); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1048.3 (Supp. 1959). In the remaining
states only existing disputes may be submitted to arbitration by consent of
the parties pursuant to statute. The submission generally is irrevocable and
judgment of court will issue on an award made in accord with the statute:
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 831 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-502 (1947); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN., Rule Civ. Proc. 109 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701 (1953);

GA. CODE ANN. § 7-201 (1936); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-901 (1948); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 10, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1941); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-201 (1946); IowA
679.18 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-201 (1949); Ky. REV.
417.010 (1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, § 1 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE
§ 16 (1957); Mss. CODE ANN. § 279 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.020
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-907 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2104
NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.030 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-2 (1953);

CODE ANN. §

STAT. §
art. 75,
(1952);
(1956);

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-544 (1953); N.D. REV. CODE § 32-2901, but see § 32-2920

(1943); S.C. CODE § 10-1901 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-504 (1954); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 225 (1947); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-1 (1953); VA.

CODE ANN. § 8-503 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5499 (1955). See generally
Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17
U. Cmi. L. REV. 233 (1950); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Arbitration Under State
Statutes (1943). As a result of Lincoln Mills arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce are enforceable in
federal courts according to federal law irrespective of the state law governing
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate where the controversy arose.
12. Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Lincoln Mills, note 19 supra. The Supreme Court held that the federal district court had jurisdiction under section
301 (a) of the LMRA over a suit by a labor organization for specific performance of the employer's promise to arbitrate grievances.
Because the Lincoln Mills decision raised many new questions and complicated some perennial ones it evoked a flood of comment. A partial list of
articles discussing the problems raised by the decision includes: Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction
to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REV. 1247 (1957);
Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959); Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1957); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mci. L. REV. 635 (1959); Isaacson, Lincoln Mills Revisited: Caution,
Judges Inventing, 12 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 191 (1959); Kramer, Arbitration
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out of collective bargaining contracts affecting interstate commerce are
federal in nature. 13 But neither that case nor subsequent decisions by
the Supreme Court requires the conclusion that state courts may not
enforce these federal, contractual rights concurrently with the
federal courts. 14 Likewise, it has been held by both state and federal
courts that section 10 (a) of the NLRA does not prohibit their enforcement of collective bargaining agreements even though the conduct underlying the action for breach of contract would also support
an unfair labor practice charge.15
In the instant case the court started from the broad premise that
Congress has pre-empted state tribunals of jurisdiction over labormanagement relations affecting interstate commerce and vested exclusive jurisdiction over those matters in the NLRB. 16 This investiture
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 255 (1958); Summers,
Individual Rights in Collective Agreements-A Preliminary Analysis, 12
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 63 (1959); Note, 59 COLuM. L. REV. 153 (1959).
13. "Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law.
...But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to
in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy.... Any
state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an
independent source of private rights." Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
14. It has traditionally been held that state courts have jurisdiction over
suits brought under a federal statute unless excluded by the statute expressly
or by implication. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876); Houston v. Moore,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 25-27 (1820); Tnm FEDERALIST No. 82 (Hamilton). State
courts have so concluded: McCarroll v. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) (an excellent opinion
by Traynor, J.); Coleman Co. v. UAW, 181 Kan. 969, 317 P.2d 831, 836 (1957);
Anchor Motor Freight Corp. v. Local 445, Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 171 N.Y.S.2d
506 (Sup. Ct.), ajfd, 5 App. Div. 2d 869, 171 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1958); Philadelphia
Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326, 115
A.2d 733 (1955).
15. Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257
F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958); Plumbers & Steamfitters Union, Local 598 v. Dillion,
255 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1958) (dictum); United Electrical Workers v. Worthington Corp., 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956); Independent Petroleum Workers v.
Esso Sandard Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1956); Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v.
Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 343 P.2d 23, 44 L.R.R.M. 2628 (Cal.
1959); Post Publishing Co. v. Cort, 334 Mass. 199, 134 N.E.2d 431 (1956); Carey
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 178 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 180 N.Y.S.2d
203 (1958). Contra, United Ass'n of Journeymen Local 469 v. Marchese, 81
Ariz. 162, 302 P.2d 930 (1956); cf. United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co., 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See generally Dunau, Contractual
Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices:JurisdictionalProblems, 57 COLuM. L.
REv. 52 (1957); Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature
and Scope, 1949 WASH. U.L.Q. 3; Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and
State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 6, 269 (1959);
Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1956); 107 U. PA. L. REv. 876 (1959).
16. The court drew this conclusion from Guss v. Utah Labor Rel. Bd., 353
U.S. 1 (1957), Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), and Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). However, the generalization is too
broad. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales, note 7 supra; United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., note 7 supra; Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Joint Bd, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, 343 P.2d 23, 31-32, 44 L.R.R.M. 2628, 2634-35 (Cal. 1959).
The Gonzales case involved a breach of contract, and the acts constituting
such breach were assumed to involve an unfair labor practice. Nevertheless,
state jurisdiction was upheld.
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is said to extend to any matter "reasonably within" the jurisdiction
of the Board, and the Board is to decide whether or not a specific
controversy involves a protected or prohibited activity. Since other
decisions have said that a court may not redress an unfair labor practice by issuing an injunction or awarding damages, 17 a majority of
the court held that the union could not obtain such a result by
characterizing the supposed unfair labor practice as a breach of contract. The court believed it would encourage employers and unions
to "circumvent the plain mandate of Congress" (that only the NLRB
redress unfair labor practices) if it enforced the terms of a collective
bargaining contract prohibiting conduct which was also proscribed by
the federal act. Two members of the court dissented from this conclusion, contending that the court was not being asked to adjudicate
an unfair labor practice, but to construe the terms of a contract. In
their opinion no congressional policy militated against a state court's
interpreting and enforcing the contractual obligations of parties to a
collective bargaining agreement even though the conduct underlying
the court action might also support an unfair practice charge before
the NLRB.
The opinion of the court in the instant case fails to recognize that
the same actions of an employer may give rise to two separate and
distinct claims when the employer is bound by a collective bargaining
agreement which forbids conduct that also amounts to an unfair labor
practice. 18 In such circumstances the employer's conduct may give
rise to a claim on the contract itself as well as an unfair labor
practice charge before the NLRB. 19 Cases sustaining the exclusive
17. The court cited Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Arista Mills Co., 193
F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951) (held: first, that there was no breach of contract;
second, the federal court is without jurisdiction to redress unfair labor practices); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183 (4th
Cir. 1948) (held: suit for an injunction would not lie to restrain an unfair
labor practice or to recover damages on account thereof); and United Packing
House Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563 (D.C. Ill. 1948) (court characterized the gravamen of the action as one to enjoin an unfair labor practice). Contrary to the inference of the court deciding the principal case, the
Court of Appeals in Arista Mills, supra said: "There is nothing in . . . [the
Amazon Cotton Mills case] or in the act itself to support the position that
breaches of contract between unions and employers may not be redressed in
the courts." 193 F.2d at 533 (4th Cir. 1951).
18. Collective bargaining agreements frequently contain clauses forbidding
activity which is also proscribed as an unfair labor practice. E.g., § 8(a) (3)
of the LMRA declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to . . . any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . ." 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1959). The contract in the principal case contained this clause: "There shall be no discrimination or intimidation against
any employee.., for engaging in ... Union activity." For other instances of
comparable provisions see 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. ff 59900.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 510, note 8 supra. With respect to section 10(a), note
3 supra, this Conference Report states: "By retaining the language [of section
10(a)] the conference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies exist,
one before the Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the Board
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jurisdiction of the NLRB against state regulation or court decisions
are intended to assure the integrity of federal policy through uniform
interpretation and the exclusion of duplicate or inconsistent state
laws. However, this policy does not remove from the states their traditional power to maintain order in labor disputes. 20 Similarly, contract enforcement is traditionally a matter of local concern.
Adjudicating a contract violation vis-a-vis an unfair labor practice
does not necessarily involve identical considerations in determining
either the merits of the dispute or the relief to be granted. 2 1 It is
part of this federal policy to encourage the assumption of obligations
in addition to the statutory ones by a contract negotiated through
the collective bargaining process, 22 and Congress clearly intended to
leave enforcement of those contract responsibilities "to the usual
''
processes of the law and not the National Labor Relations Board."
Compelling evidence that the settlement of disputes between employer and union according to the grievance procedure of their collective agreement will further this primal aspect of federal policy
is that the Board may decline to exercise its jurisdiction to remedy
an unfair labor practice and recognize the private settlement.24 Judishall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, other remedies."

20. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959).
See note 7 supra.

21. First, the standards of conduct imposed by statute and judge-made law
are governmentally coerced, but the standards under a collective bargaining
agreement are voluntarily assumed. Those standards assumed by contract
may be co-extensive with the statute, or they may cover more ground than
the statute. It follows then that interpretations of the contract provisions by
an arbitrator selected by the parties must be based upon their contract as
best he can interpret and apply it to the dispute, whereas the standards developed through interpretation of the statute must necessarily be capable of
general application. Secondly, the arbitrator possesses more remedial discretion than does the NLRB. Thirdly, though conduct which breaches a collective
bargaining agreement may be an unfair labor practice, breach of such a
contract in itself is not an unfair practice. See note 8 supra. Consequently,
the NLRB does not construe and enforce collective bargaining agreements.
Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., note 15 supra.
These considerations, to name only a few, are ignored by a swift syllogism
that automatically deduces from the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over
statutory standards that it also has exclusive jurisdictions over similar standards assumed by contract. Such reasoning assumes there is no relevant difference between imposed law and voluntary agreement. See generally

Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 CoLuM. L. REv. 52 (1957); 107 U. PA. L. Rzv. 876 (1959).
22. "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to .. . [encourage]
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining ..... " 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1959). See note 8 supra and note 24 infra.
23. H.R. REP. No. 510, note 8 supra.
24. In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955) the Board stated
the standards governing this deference: "[T]he proceedings appear to have
been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision
of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act. In these circumstances we believe that the desirable objective of
encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor disputes will best be served
by our recognition of the arbitrators' award." The Board has recognized it is
not bound, as a policy matter, by an arbitration award. See, e.g., Monsanto
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cial sanctions would not affect the power of the NLRB over unfair
labor practices but would effectuate congressional policy by making
collective bargaining agreements effective.

PROFESSION OF LAW-BAR ASSOCIATION MAY NOT
DISCIPLINE AN ATTORNEY FOR CONDUCT AS AN OFFICIAL
WHEN THE ACTS COULD NOT BE COMMITTED BY OTHER
MEMBERS OF BAR
Respondent, an attorney and county judge, unjustifiably barred
certain lawyers from practicing in the probate court over which he
presided. Because his conduct was apparently motivated by personal
animosity, a complaint was filed with the Kentucky Bar Association.
The Board of Bar Commissioners, after a hearing, recommended
that respondent be suspended from practicing law for two years. He
appealed. Held, action dismissed. Acts of misconduct by an attorney
which are capable of commission only by those members of the
bar in a peculiar position such as judge, shall not be the subject of
disciplinary action by the Bar Association; only those acts which are
capable of commission by any member of the bar (regardless of
position) shall be the subject of such action. In re Wehrman, 327
S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1959).
Disciplinary action by bar associations is generally agreed to serve
three purposes: protection of the public, protection of the legal profession's reputation, and punishment of the individual.' A majority of
jurisdictions, emphasizing the first two of these purposes, hold that an
attorney-public officer may be disciplined even though the misconduct
could have been committed only by one holding the public office. 2
Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953);

NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324

U.S. 877 (1945). Arbitration awards were disregarded, e.g., in Wertheimer
Stores Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1954) (employee whose rights were involved
opposed arbitration), and NLRB Gen. Counsel Adm. Rul. Case No. 1079, 35
L.R.R.M. 1450 (1954) (arbitration conducted unfairly). See generally
Jenkins, The Impact of Lincoln Mills on the NLRB, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 355
(1959); Levitt, Inter-relationshipsin the Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 10 LAB. L.J. 484 (1957); Samoff & Summers, Effects of Collective Bargaining Provisions on NLRB Action, 8 LAB. L.J. 676 (1957); Wollett,
The Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Who Should Have
Primary Jurisdiction, 10 LAB. L.J. 477 (1959); Comment, 69 HARv. L. REV.
725 (1956).
1. See, e.g., In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379, aff'd, 216 N.W. 127
(1927), 41 HARv. L. REv. 99 (1927), 4 Wis. L. REV. 375 (1928).
2. The following cases were not decided in the language of the principal
court's test; they do, however, decide the issue involved. In re Spriggs, 36
Ariz. 262, 284 Pac. 521 (1930) (judge falsified court records to aid former
client); State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914) (judge misconducted
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This rule is based on the theory that one who demonstrates by any
conduct that he is unworthy of trust should not be an attorney. 3 A
minority of jurisdictions have held that when misconduct occurs in
an official capacity such as a judge the exclusive disciplinary action
is by impeachment or other statutory procedure for removal from
office. 4 The latter courts apparently look upon bar association action
as primarily a punitive measure and hence conclude that since removal from office would accomplish the same result, such removal
is the exclusive remedy. 5
The court in the principal case denies jurisdiction of the bar association even to censure the respondent as an attorney. It cites
only two cases, one of which is not in point on the real issue of the
case. 6 The other, In re Lynch,7 involved a defendant who, while a
public officer, misappropriated public funds and was disbarred. The
court there declared that an attorney who in any way showed himself
unworthy of confidence was subject to bar discipline.8 Had this rule
been applied in the principal case, the bar association would have had
jurisdiction. The instant court chose not to follow this rule, but rather
to lay down an inconsistent test which limits the bar association's
jurisdiction much more narrowly. 9 This test is most difficult to apply.
One may say that in the Lynch case the wrong was embezzlement, an
settlement of an estate); Underwood v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 32,

105 S.W. 151 (1907) (county attorney bootlegged); In re Hobbs, 75 N.H. 285,
73 Atl. 303 (1909) (justice of peace failed to keep records required by statute);
Weston v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 177 Okla. 467, 61 P.2d 229, (1936)
(misconduct of judge of county court in an official capacity); 12 WASH. L. REV.
83 (1937); 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 267 (1937); In re Rempfer, 51 S.D. 393, 216 N.W.
355 (1927) (judge acted as attorney for clients who were to come before him
as judge); In re Burton, 67 Utah 118, 246 Pac. 188 (1926) (judge engaged in
running verbal fight with attorney general); In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214
N.W. 379, aff'd, 216 N.W. 127 (1927) (judge borrowed money from known
bootleggers who were to come before his court, disbarment disqualified him
to be a judge), 41 HARV. L. REv. 99 (1927); 4 Wis. L. REv. 375 (1928); Comment, 5 ARK. L. REv. 411 (1951). Cf. In re Gibbs, 51 S.D. 464, 214 N.W. 850
(1927).
3. See the usual expression of this theory in the courts' language note 8
infra.
4. In re Borie, 166 La. 855, 118 So. 45 (1928) (assistant district attorney
guilty of negligence in discharging his official duties); In re Strahl, 201 App.
Div. 729, 195 N.Y.S. 385 (1922) (judge); In re Silkman, 88 App. Div. 102,
84 N.Y.S. 1025 (1903) (surrogate illegally also practiced law). In the
Strahl case the court laid great emphasis on the fact that disbarment in that
case would disqualify the defendant judge to be a judge-an anomalous situation.
5. See, e.g., In re Silkman, 88 App. Div. 102, 84 N.Y.S. 1025 (1903) (dissent).
6. In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W.2d 730 (1943), was a case in which the
defendant-attorney held no office and was disbarred because of habitual
drunkenness.
7. 238 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1951).
8. "It is not necessary that the misconduct of an attorney be connected with
his professional acts to bring about his disbarment ....
If his conduct, although
outside his professional dealings, shows him to be unworthy of confidence,
he may be disbarred." 238 S.W.2d at 120.
9. 327 S.W.2d at 744.
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act subject to commission by any member of the bar, while another
might maintain that the wrong was embezzlement of public funds
and not every attorney can commit that wrong, but only those who
are public officers entrusted with public funds. The court says that
Wehrman's wrong was judicial tyranny and all attorneys cannot be
guilty of this conduct, but one might assert that Wehrman's wrong
was a violation of his duty to respect his professional colleagues or
not to allow his personal bias to determine his professional conduct,
either of which may be done by any attorney. The conclusion is
that a given wrong may fall within or without the bar association's
jurisdiction depending upon the terms employed to characterize the
wrongO Assuming arguendo that the test can be consistently applied, how will it serve its alleged purpose of preventing the disciplinary processes from becoming "an avenue to personal, religious
or political reprisal"?" True, by limiting the jurisdiction of the association, the number of cases which it may hear are reduced and
therefore fewer opportunities for "personal reprisal" are presented,
but is this not true of any limitation on jurisdiction? In view of the
complicated and costly procedures for removal from office, would not
the application of this test from a practical standpoint often result in
reprehensible conduct going unpunished. One doubts if this result
is better than allowing occasional abuse of the disciplinary process.
It is submitted that the majority view of unlimited power to discipline an attorney is the better rule. 12 Certainly one purpose of sub10. Is this not analogous to the impossibility of distinguishing between
impossibility in law and impossibility in fact found in criminal law? See 13
VAND.L. REv. 790 (1960).
11. 327 S.W.2d at 744.
12. In In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379 (1927), often cited as the
majority view, the defendant was judge of a superior court. A qualification
of such office was that the aspirant be an attorney. While holding such position he borrowed substantial sums of money from known bootleggers, who
subsequently were tried in his court. No irregularity in conducting the trials
was alleged. However, because of the impropriety of a judge, not just an
attorney, borrowing money from such outlaws who had previously been before him and undoubtedly would come before him again, the bar association
sought and obtained his disbarment. The defense was that his misconduct was
in the official capacity of a judge (misconduct that any attorney could not
commit) and hence impeachment was the exclusive remedy. The court at
214 N.W. 385 in affirming the disbarment reasoned that the wrong grew out
of defendant's holding the position of a judge and so acting, that were he
only an attorney the loan would have been permissible. At 214 N.W. 382-83,
the court states: "The fact that he may be judge of the superior court, or
that he may hold any other office, does not affect the duty or power of the
court. He cannot take unto himself any office or position, or shroud himself
in any garb, which will place him beyond the power of this court to keep its
roster of attorneys clean." At 214 N.W. 383 the court further declared:
"One may lack morality in a great many ways. Where this lack of
morality has no relation to, and does not affect, his duties and responsibilities as an attorney at law, the delinquencies are generally overlooked
by the courts. But where there is lacking honesty, probity, integrity, and
fidelity to trusts reposed in him, it matters not whether the lack of such

virtues is revealed in transactions with clients, in the conduct of law
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jecting any attorney to bar association discipline whether he is acting
as a public official or not, is to punish the offender; but more importantly the purposes are (1) to protect those who might become
his clients in the future and (2) to protect the reputation of the
profession. If the only purpose of disciplinary action is to punish the
attorney, the criminal law, at least in most instances, would seem to
3
be sufficient and hence the exclusive remedy.'

TAXATION-INCOME-ACCUMULATION OF CORPORATE
EARNINGS RESULTING FROM DEADLOCK BETWEEN THE
ONLY TWO SHAREHOLDERS
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that petitioner,
a closely-held corporation,' had accumulated its earnings beyond the
reasonable needs of the business and was therefore liable for the
penalty tax imposed by section 102 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939.2 Upon notice by the Commissioner, 3 petitioner submitted a
suits, or any other business dealings or relations." (Emphasis added.)
13. The court apparently ignored Underwood v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. L.
Rep. 32, 105 S.W. 151 (1907), in which a County Attorney was disbarred for
failing to prosecute retailers of liquor and for retailing liquors in violation of
the local option law himself.
1. The actual petitioner was Jerome E. Casey, transferee of the assets of
Bankers Development Corporation. At the time of the alleged unreasonable
accumulation the corporation was still a going concern, but in 1951 Mr. Casey
acquired the outstanding 50% of Bankers' stock, and in 1953 dissolved the
corporation selling it to another of his firms, the Thrifti-Check Service Corporation. For purposes of the present discussion we shall refer to the
petitioner as the corporation since it has the tax burden. Prior to 1921 the tax
was levied on the individual shareholders, but Congress realized the undesirableness of this procedure as pointed out in the case of Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S. 189 (1920). Section 220 of the 1921 Code transferred the incidence of
the tax to the corporation where it has since remained.
2. Since the years 1948 to 1950 are under consideration we are concerned
with the substantive law of section 102(a) of the 1939 Code, which provides
as follows:
"There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year ...
upon the net income of every corporation ...

if such corporation, however

created or organized, is formed or availed of for the purpose of pre-

venting the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders . . . through

the medium of permitting earnings or profits to accumulate instead of
being divided or distributed . . . ." INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 102(a), 53
Stat. 35 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531).
3. Section 534 establishes the burden of proof as follows:
"(a) General Rule.-In any proceeding before the Tax Court involving
a notice of deficiency based in whole or in part on the allegation that all
or any part of the earnings and profits have been permitted to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business, the burden of proof with
respect to such allegation shall"(1) If notification has not been sent in accordance with subsection
(b), be on the Secretary or his delegate, or
(2) if the taxpayer has submitted the statement described in subsection
(c), be on the Secretary or his delegate with respect to the grounds set
forth in such statement in accordance with the provisions of such sub-

19601

RECENT CASES

statement contending that a deadlock between the two shareholders
over the question of spending accumulated earnings for the modernization of machinery is a reasonable ground for the retention of earnings. The Tax Court thought an accumulation for such a purpose
unreasonable 4 and held that the corporation had been used for the
purpose 5 of preventing taxation of individual shareholder's dividends.
On appeal, held, reversed. Where the earnings of a corporation are
accumulated because of a deadlock between the only two shareholders, section 102 will not apply unless the Conunissioner can prove
that an illegal purpose was also involved. Casey v. Commissioner,
267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959).
Section 102 (a) 6 is designed to prevent high-bracket shareholders
from utilizing the corporate form to avoid personal taxation on
dividends. 7 This tax is inoperative as to any accumulation, or any
section.
"(b) Notification by Secretary.-Before mailing the notice of deficiency
referred to in subsection (a), the Secretary or his delegate may send by
registered mail a notification informing the taxpayer that the proposed
notice of deficiency includes an amount with respect to the accumulated
earnings tax imposed by section 531....
"(c) Statement by Taxpayer.-Within such time ... after the mailing
of the notification ... the taxpayer may submit a statement of the grounds
on which the taxpayer relies to establish that.., the.., profits have
not been permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business.
(e) Application of Section.-(1) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, this section shall apply with respect to taxable years to which this
subchapter applies and ...

to taxable years to which the corresponding

provisions of prior revenue laws apply.
"(2) In the case of a notice of deficiency for a taxable year to which
this subchapter does not apply, this section shall apply only in the case
of proceedings tried on the merits after the date of the enactment of this
paragraph." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 534, as amended, ch. 805, 69 Stat.
690, 691 (1955).
4. The Tax Court decided that the corporation was only affected by the tax
for the year 1950. For all items that were proved to be within the reasonable
business needs the court allowed deductions, as set out below:
Actual accumulation of earnings for 1950 ......................... $173,970.71
Contingent liability in pending litigation ............. $43,825.14
Unoperative portions of signed contracts .............. 26,640.60
Tax Court allowed for expansion .................... 50,000.00
Total held as within reasonable needs ........................... 120,465.74
Amount of earnings in question ................................. $ 53,504.97
5. The purpose to avoid taxes does not have to be the sole or even primary
reason for the accumulation. Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d
424 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
6. This tax has been in existence in some form or another since 1913. See
for a complete study of its history LASSER & HOLZMAN, CORPORATE ACCUMULA-

TIONS AND SEcTioN 102 (1949); Buck & Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by

Corporations Under the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. REV. 141 (1950); Rudick,
Effect of the Corporate Income Tax on Management Policies, 2 How. L.J.
233-49 (1956).
7. Some benefits that can be gained by accumulation of the earnings are
listed below, but in using any one of these methods the taxpayer is leaving
himself open to the 102 unreasonable accumulations tax.
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part of an accumulation that can be proven to exist for a reasonable
business need. 8 Prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the burden of justifying such an accumulation was
placed on the tax-paying corporation. 9 If the corporation failed to
meet this burden, section 102 (c) of the 1939 Code created an additional
burden requiring the corporation to prove by a clear preponderance
of the evidence that the accumulation was not allowed for the purpose of establishing a tax sanctuary for corporate shareholders. 10
Congressional investigations revealed that in certain instances harmful results were created by placing the burden of proving the accumulation reasonable upon the taxpayer;" consequently section 534
(a) If the shareholders of a close corporation already have a high income

and do not care to increase their tax burden, they can allow the profits to

remain with the corporation by refusing to declare dividends. In some cases
the stockholders are in such a high income tax bracket (since individual income
taxes may run as high as 91%) that it would be better to have the corporation
taxed for unreasonable accumulation of profits (for such a tax is never greater
than 38%%). (b) By permitting a surplus to arise the shareholders have a
source from which to draw in periods when their outside incomes slack off.
(c) Another plan is to allow an accumulation so as to increase the value of
the corporate stock in order to later liquidate the firm and apply "capital
gains" treatment to its assets (this tax imposes a maximum rate of 26%).
(d) If the surplus is allowed to remain until the death of the shareholder, his
estate will have to pay only the inheritance tax based on the market value
of the stock at the time of death. No matter which policy the shareholders
adopt they are eventually taxed; it is only in the consideration of which tax
is the lesser that there is an element of discretion.
8. A closely-held corporation is a more common target for this tax than
a publicly owned one, for seldom will the purpose of avoiding dividend
taxation be present in a public-issue corporation. But see Trico Products
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 5. In that case the tax was imposed upon
a corporation although there were over two thousand stockholders. It is to be
noted, however, that six persons held 74% of the outstanding shares. A
minority stockholders' suit was brought against the directors, who were the
principle shareholders, to recover damages suffered by payment of the tax.
It was settled by the directors personal payment of one-fourth of the taxes
claimed. Trico Products Corp. v. McGowan, 169 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 899 (1948), rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 913 (1949). See
also 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.17 (1958).
9. This was dealt with under the 1939 Code by TREAs. REG. 11 29.102-2

(1944). For a lucid discussion of the effect of this allocation of the burden, see
Judge Learned Hand's opinion for the court in United Business Corp. of
America v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1933). The effects of the
changes brought about by the 1954 Code are presented under TREAs. REG. §§
1.533 to 1.534-4 (1955).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 102(c), 53 Stat. 35 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 533), provides: "The fact that the earnings or profits of a corporation
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall
be determinative of the purpose to avoid surtax upon shareholders unless
the corporation by the clear preponderance of evidence shall prove to the
contrary." Compare this provision with the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 533 in
which the word "clear" is omitted.
11. (1) It appeared that cases were brought without a thorough analysis
of the facts involved. The Commissioner could get away with this since

his findings were conclusive until proved false by the taxpayer. (2) Threats

of a deficiency under section 102 were used to force the taxpayer to yield
on other tax issues that were not so easily established. (3) Small corpora-

tions would pay the tax rather than undergo the expensive litigation caused

by the difficulties of proving a case under the existing statute. (4) This rule
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of the 1954 Code was introduced to shift the burden, under conditional circumstances, to the Commissioner. 12 This particular section was made applicable to all cases involving section 102 or section
531 which would arise after its adoption, 3 and therefore controls
the instant case. Prior to the present decision the courts in dealing
with cases in which the application of section 534 was clearly placed
in issue refused to shift the burden of proof.1 4 Particularly important

among these cases was the Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner 5
decision, which wrought much disturbance. It was feared that the
long-sought revision, 6 apparently effected by section 534, was of
little or no value to the taxpayer. 17 While all the cases in which
section 534 was not applied dealt with the problem under section 102
of the 1939 Code, concern was expressed that the same policy would
also be adopted in situations involving section 531.18
The principal case represents the first proper judicial analysis of
section 534,19 but the court refuses to make this interpretation the sole
basis of its decision.20 Although seemingly disposing of the reasonableness of the accumulation in terms of a frustration of purpose
doctrine, 21 the court apparently was satisfied that this accumulation
had the effect of allowing the Commissioner to second-guess the decisions of
the directors, and much criticism was voiced against it. This was particularly
important in dealing with young corporations that had to retain earnings to
protect against unforeseen problems. See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 52 & 173 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 & 315 (1954).
12. See note 3 supra.

13. See § 534(e) of the 1954 Code as set out in note 3 supra.

14. See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
15. 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958).
16. In 1948 virtually the same provisions that were adopted by section 534
of the 1954 Code were proposed. H.R. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). Explained in the Ways and Means Committee Rep., No. 2087, 8-9, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1948). This change, among others, has been advocated by several

groups since the enactment of the 1939 Code. See Boland, Section 102: A
PersistentMenace to Closely-Held Corporations,27 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 30-35
(1952); Cary, Accumulations Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business:
The Dilemma of Section 102(c), 60 HAnv. L. REV. 1282, 1293 (1947); Norvell,
Improper Accumulations of Surplus, 1 VAnn. L. REv. 227, 241 (1948).

17. The attitude of the Tax Court seemed to be to entirely ignore the re-

vision. The filing of a statement by the taxpayer in compliance with section
534(c) did not benefit him, but only served as a notice to the Commissioner
of what the taxpayer intended to rely upon in building his case.
18. Prior to this decision further legislation appeared to be the only way to
insure the adoption of the intended reform. See Barker, Penalty Tax on Corporations Improperly Accumulating Surplus, 35 TAXES 949, 953 (1957).
19. "The Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . had the burden of proof
that Bankers had unreasonably accumulated profits. We think that the 1954
and 1955 enactments indicated that Congress did not want the taxing authorities to be second-guessing the responsible managers of corporations as to
whether and to what extent profits should be retained, unless the taxing
authorities were in a position to prove that their position was correct." 267
F.2d at 30.
20. "[T]he real controversy is as to the presence ior absence of a business
reason for accumulating rather than distributing the corporate earnings." 267
F.2d at 27.
21. "But if, as in the instant case, the funds are accumulated because of a
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met the established judicial criteria for reasonableness because there
was a plan for expansion.22 On its facts23 this case is merely an addition to the cases which follow the theory that one method for providing means for expansion and rejuvenation of a corporation is by
the accumulation of earnings, and that a planned and executed
program for such meets the Code's requirement of reasonableness. 24
This segment of the holding, while only a minor contribution to the
case law,25 diminishes the effectiveness of the decision in relationship
to the more important element of burden of proof.
The approach of the Tax Court in dealing with cases in which
section 534 is in issue has been to decide issues after a consideration
of the record as a whole, and without particular attention to the
burden of proof. 26 The Seventh Circuit in the Pelton Steel case in-

directly approved this practice by affirmation of a Tax Court ruling
based upon such grounds.27 The Second Circuit in the instant case
issued an unequivocal denial of this view of section 534 by proclaiming that the Commissioner has the burden of proving the accumulation unreasonable.2 8 Moreover, the court proffered as dictum the
deadlock between two equal shareholders as to whether to spend them or

not ... the presumption of motive does not seem to fit." 267 F.2d at 32.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. Note the lengthy statement of facts set out by the court in this case,
which is indicative of the importance placed upon factual situations in tax
cases. The Tax Court has itself recognized this in stating: "In the numerous
decisions and conclusions in cases of this character there is no set standard of
measurement. Prominent factors in one case may become minor in another."
Universal Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 627, 637 (1945). There is little
possibility that the facts present in the Casey decision will appear again in
the near future. Any court faced by the situation of a deadlock may well
question whether such an impasse came into being by accident or was an intentional plan to gain the benefits of the present ruling. This holding definitely
offers an opening for evasion of taxes by corporations of questionable
reputation.
24. It is not required by the tax law that business remain static. Expansion
may be provided for by new capital or borrowed money, but it is equally
within the contemplation of the Code that it be done by the accumulation of
earnings. Crawford County Printing & Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 17
T.C. 1414 (1952); J. L. Goodman Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 530
(1948); Lion Clothing Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1181 (1947). In line with
the present case, it has been held that modernization of equipment to meet
competitive conditions justifies an accumulation in surplus to finance it.
General Smelting Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 313 (1944).
25. For provocative consideration of the different methods by which
accumulations may be justified, see LAsSER & HOLZMAN, supra note 6, at 65;
SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATIoN, 932-40 (1955).
26. The Tax Court in the case in point adopted this approach. 16 T.C.M.
1024, 1026 (1957). See also Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
No. 6 (1958), aff'd, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1959); Pelton Steel Casting Co. v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C. 153 (1957), affd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958); Watkins
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. No. 31 (1958); Penn Needle Art Co. v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. 504 (1958); Breifeller Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner,
28 T.C. 1164 (1957). For a compilation and discussion of these and other
cases, see Altman, Corporate Accumulation of Earnings, 36 TAXEs 933, 936
(1958).
27. See note 26 supra.
28. See note 19 supra.
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opinion that this would be an element to be considered in the review
of future Tax Court decisions. 29 This conclusion is a distinct contribution since it expresses the intended results of section 534, but the
holding itself, grounded on the reasonableness of the accumulation
rather than the failure of the Tax Court to shift the burden of
proof, falls short of its potential impact. Although the path to be
followed in future decisions is established by the present case, full
implementation of congressional intent remains for a later decision.

TAXATION-INCOME-PAYMENT MADE TO EMPLOYEE UPON
RETIREMENT IN APPRECIATION OF SERVICES IS NOT A GIFT
Taxpayer, upon his voluntary resignation as comptroller of a church
and as president and director of the corporation organized to manage
the real property of the church, received a payment of $20,000 from
the corporation in appreciation of his services for the past ten years,
subject to the condition that he abandon all rights' to pension and retirement benefits. The taxpayer reported this payment as a gift, but
the Commissioner treated it as compensation and assessed a deficiency.2 In a refund suit the district court held that the payment
was a gift.3 On appeal, held, reversed. A payment received by an
employee from his employer upon voluntary resignation is compensation, unless the employee sustains the burden of proving that the
payment resulted from friendship or affection rather than gratitude
for exceptional services rendered. Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d
727 (2d Cir. 1959).
The boundary between gifts and compensation for federal income
29. "This recent expression of Congress should, perhaps have some bearing
upon our approach to our review of the Tax Court's decision." 267 F.2d at 30.
1. The taxpayer presented uncontradicted testimony to establish that he

was thought to have no such rights. 268 F.2d at 728. Although the resolution
to pay the gratuity was adopted by the Trinity Operating Co., Inc., a subsidi-

ary of the Corporation of Trinity Church, the release of rights and claims was
given to the Corporation of Trinity Church. The church paid $9,600 of the
gratuity and the remaining $10,400 was paid by the operating company.
"There was no consideration whatever which entered into the passing of
the resolution nor did the church or any of its subsidiaries owe the plain-

tiff any money on account of salary or for any other reason. The $20,000
was paid to plaintiff as a gratuity and bore no relationship to his salary
and was treated by the donor as a gratuity on its books. Neither the
church nor the operating company received any federal tax benefit on

account of the gratuity paid to the plaintiff, nor were any amounts with-

held from such payments.
"Plaintiff had been a member of the pension plan of Trinity Church but
contributions paid by him were returned to him subsequent to his resig-

nation." Stanton v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 803, 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
2. Under INT. REv. CODE Or 1939, § 22 (a), 45 STAT. 791 (now INT. REV. CODE

oF 1954, § 61(a)).
3. 137 F. Supp. 803.
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tax purposes is not clearly defined. The problem often arises where
an employer makes a payment to an employee upon termination of
the employment relationship. Several tests4 have been formulated by
the courts in attempting to distinguish between gifts and compensation. The Supreme Court in Bogardus v. Commissioner5 sets forth
6
three such tests: (1) Was there an intent to make a gift? (2) Was
7
(3) Was an expense
there an obligation to make the payment?
The Court in
payment?
deduction claimed by the payor for the
merely becompensation
Bogardus held that a gift did not become
cause it was inspired by gratitude for the past faithful services of the
recipient. 8 But in that case the government and the taxpayer had
stipulated that the disbursements "were not made or intended to be
made ... as payment or compensation for any services rendered or
4. The common law requirement of donative intent is a sine qua non for
gifts. As Chommie noted, the other tests required by the courts are simply
evaluations of circumstantial factors from which inferences may be drawn
of the employer's true intent. Chommie, Payments to Employees: Gifts or
Compensation for Services?, 31 TAXEs 620 (1953). Where the employer refers
to the payment as compensation, this is usually controlling. However, even
where the payment is labeled a "gift," if there is any treatment or characterization of the payment by the employer inconsistent with its being considered
a gift, the courts sometimes seize at this as a "Freudian slip" indicating lack
of donative intent. See, for example, Arnold J. Mount, 10 B.T.A. 1156 (1928)
where a deposit slip credited to employee's account was marked "gift," but
the resolution passed by the employer's board of directors authorizing the
payment labeled it a "bonus."
Since corporate officers are authorized only to pay reasonable compensation
to employees and are generally considered to violate their fiduciary duties to
the stockholders if they make gifts of corporation assets to private individuals,
there is a presumption of law that the directors do not violate their duties and
therefore that corporations do not make gifts. Fitch v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 583
(8th Cir. 1934). Stockholders may, however, specifically authorize their directors to make certain payments as gifts. Cunningham v. Commissioner, 67
F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1933); Jones v. Commissioner, 31 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1929);
Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929).
5. 302 U.S. 34 (1937) (5-4 decision). In this case, the only Supreme Court
decision on this subject, Justice Sutherland's opinion rejected the view of the
Second Circuit opinion of Judge L. Hand that payments such as the ones in
question "may be at once 'gifts' . . . and 'compensation for personal service'
.... " Bogardus v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 646, 647 (1937). Sutherland maintained
that the terms are mutually exclusive. 302 U.S. at 39.
The dissent upheld the Hand position that the categories of "gift" and
"compensation"
at times can overlap. "What controls is not the presence or
absence of consideration. What controls is the intention with which payment,
however voluntary, has been made. Has it been made with the intention that
services rendered in the past shall be requited more completely, though full
acquittance has been given? If so, it bears a tax. Has it been made to show
good will, esteem, or kindliness toward persons who happen to have served,
but who are paid without thought to make requital for the service? If so, it
is exempt." 302 U.S. at 44-45. Note that Judge Hand also wrote the opinion
in the instant case.
6. See note 4 supra.
7. "Unlike the law of contracts, however, the Internal Revenue Code recognizes past consideration as a valid exchange for present compensation. It does
not matter that the corporation had nothing but a clearer conscience to gain
from the payment of adequate consideration for past services." Carrigan v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1952).
8. 302 U.S. at 44.
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to be rendered or for any consideration given or to be given" to the
payor or any of its stockholders. 9 Subsequent decisions by the lower
federal courts, however, tended to restrict the application of the
Bogardus holding. 0 The payment to the employee may be income
even though the employee had no right to enforce its payment.'
The test applied in Nickelsburg v. Commissioner 12 was whether
"what was added was by way of more compensation for a deserving
employee or merely to satisfy the employer's desire to become a
benefactor."' 13 A strong presumption has evolved that any payment
made to an employee, although in excess of that for which the
employee had an enforceable claim, is compensation for services
rendered.' 4 On the other hand, in a number of cases where clergymen have been granted pecuniary awards by their congregations upon
their retirement, the strong personal affection felt by the parishioners
has been recognized as the inducement to make a gift.15
The court distinguished the instant case from Bogardus in three
respects.'6 First, the employer corporation in Bogardus had changed
ownership and was not the payor. In the instant case, however,
the company paying the taxpayer was the same one which had been
his employer and continued its business subsequent to the payment.
Second, in Bogardus there was a distribution plan which covered
payments to all employees, whereas in the principal case a single
payment was made to the taxpayer in appreciation of his particular
services. Third, the condition precedent to the payment in the instant
case which required the taxpayer to relinquish all rights to pension
and retirement benefits was incompatible with a payment motivated
9. Id. at 38.

10. Ruth Jackson, 25 T.C. 1106 (1956).

Employer paid a sum of money to

taxpayer on termination of employment on the condition that taxpayer execute a general release of all claims against the employer. The Tax Court, in
holding that the payment was income, distinguished

Bogardus on two

grounds: (1) The payment in Bogardus was not made by the employer; (2)
the payor and payee in Bogardus stipulated that the payments were not
made for services rendered. For other cases tending to limit application of
the Bogardus rule, see notes 11, 12 and 14 infra.
11. Hubert v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1954); Poorman v.
Commissioner, 131 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1942); Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust

Co. v. Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

12. 154 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1946). Compare this test with that of the Bogardus

dissent, supranote 5.
13. Id. at 71.
14. "An employer may make a gift to an employee without rendering it
taxable whether made before, during or after the termination of service.
However, a payment of an additional sum by an employer to an employee
carries a strong presumption that such payment is for services rendered."
Willkie v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 953, 955 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 659 (1942).
15. Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949). See also Mutch v.
Commissioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1954); Abernathy v. Commissioner, 211
F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd per curiam, 20 T.C. 593 (1953); Rev. Rul.
55-422, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 14, acquiescing in above cases.
16. 208 F.2d at 728.
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wholly by generosity. 17 The instant case was also distinguished from
those cases in which a promise to make payments to the employees
was implied from established practices.'8 The court indicated that
there are two probable motives for awarding an honorarium to an
employee who has performed his duties in an outstanding manner: 19
(1) The employer may feel that the employee has rendered more than
the standard of acceptable service required, which resulted in benefits
to the employer in excess of those to which he was legally entitled,
and (2) the employer may feel friendship or affection for the employee. The court found that the second motive existed in the cases
in which retirement awards to ministers had been held to be gifts,
since "in such cases the parishioners are apt to be largely moved by
gratitude for spiritual direction, kindness and affection and do not
think in quantitative terms of whatever financial gains the pastor may
have contributed to the corporation."20 In this case, however, the court
held that since the taxpayer failed to sustain the burden of proving
that the payment resulted from the second motive, it was assumed
that it was attributable to the former motive, i.e., in appreciation for
the taxpayer's success in managing the corporation's real estate. The
payment was therefore deemed taxable as compensation for past ex21
ceptional services.
This case contributes little clarity in this area of legal perplexity.
The court applied a subjective test of donative intent similar to that
23
propounded in the Bogardus22 dissent and applied in the Nickelsburg
case. The instant case would be more instructive if, instead of
merely holding that the taxpayer had failed to sustain his burden of
proving that the payment was a gift, the court had explained more
specifically what is required to sustain this burden. It is still unclear
what proof will sufficiently establish the requisite friendship or affec17. In the dissent Judge Hincks pointed out that these grounds of distinction
are tenuous. In Bogardus the effect was the same as if the employer-employee
relationship had existed at the time of the payments, since the stockholders
of the payor corporation had received the economic benefits of the payee's
work. Id. at 730.
The payments in Bogardus were made by Unopco Corporation to a group of
former and present employees of Universal Oil Products Company. Some of
the payees had been for several years out of the employ of Universal. One
of the recipients was the sister of a Universal employee killed in an accident
over eleven years before the payments. Unopco had been formed for the
purpose of acquiring, and did acquire certain assets of Universal. All of the
stock of Universal was then sold to United Gasoline Corporation. All the
former Universal stockholders became Unopco stockholders with the same
proportionate holdings. After the sale of Universal stock none of the former
Universal stockholders held any Universal or United stock. 302 U.S. at 36-37.
18. 208 F.2d at 729.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. See note 5 supra.
23. See note 12 supra.
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tion felt for an employee or the close personal nature of the services
rendered by an employee which is necessary to support a finding that
the payment was a gift. It seems, however, that the instant case was
correctly decided, although the court did not particularly emphasize
the factor which most clearly made the payment compensation, i.e.,
the fact that the taxpayer was required to relinquish all rights to
pension and retirement benefits.24 This case did, however, limit the
application of the holdings in the series of cases in which awards paid
to retiring ministers had been held to be gifts. 25 It is now apparent
that church employees other than ministers are not necessarily
afforded such preferred tax treatment. It is hoped that the Supreme
Court will avail itself of this case to clarify the distinction between
26
gifts and compensation.
24. See note 1 supra. Although it was thought that the taxpayer had no
such rights, the requirement that he abandon any possible rights indicates
that this was an "arms length" transaction rather than a gesture of affection
or friendship primarily.
25. See note 15 supra.
26. Petition for cert. filed, 28 U.S.L. WEE= 3182 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1959) (No.
546); arguments heard, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3277 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1960).

